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Abstract 
This article investigates the economic value and the optimal expected traceback rate of success 
for a traceability system with a case study of injection-site lesions in fed cattle in the US.   By 
maintaining the identity of the feedlot owners corresponding to retail beef cuts, a traceability 
system enables the employment of incentive mechanisms by a meat packer to overcome supply 
chain information asymmetry.  Results of this article show that the first-best action of producers 
may be induced by meat packers with incentive mechanisms created with a low expected 
traceback rate of success.  This suggests that even inexpensive traceability systems may induce 
appropriate actions by producers and objectives of inducing compliance by suppliers may be less 
costly than objectives of recall.  
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A Principal-Agent Model for Evaluating the Economic Value of a Beef Traceability 
System: A Case Study with Injection-site Lesion Control in Fed Cattle 
The meat supply chain is traditionally a chain of independent production firms where product 
moves from one supplier to the next through open market transactions.  Qualities, quantities and 
prices are established through observation and negotiation.  In this market structure, downstream 
operations often do not have full information about food safety and food quality efforts exerted 
in upstream stages of production, and direct monitoring of production processes is often 
prohibitively expensive.  Moreover, problems that occur at an upstream stage of production often 
manifest themselves in downstream stages of production at which point the original supplier 
identity is lost.  Some of the more prominent issues include toxic substances such as dioxin, 
foreign objects in products (e.g., broken syringe needles from health treatments), bacterial 
contamination, and feeding of restricted ingredients (e.g., animal by-products in the case of 
BSE).  
In response, efforts have been made to reduce supply chain anonymity by implementing 
production protocols, information technology and supply chain management processes to 
improve identification of products and suppliers throughout the supply chain.   This complex 
process is referred to as traceability.  The International Organization for Standardization (2000) 
states that traceability systems create the ability to retrieve the history and application or location 
of an article or an activity or process through a registered identification.  Implementing 
traceability may go beyond information systems to include alteration of the production process. 
For instance, limitations on product mixing may be needed for segregating output to preserve its 
origin identity (Antle 2001).   
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Firms considering implementation of traceability must evaluate the direct costs and 
benefits of available traceability systems taking into account their breadth, depth and precision1.   
However, in addition to the direct cost-benefit analysis, the value of using traceability to improve 
the behavior and compliance of upstream suppliers is an important consideration.  Product 
tracing can improve the quality or safety of the final product and also ensure that appropriate 
market signals are communicated, reducing the sub-par performance predicated on information 
asymmetry and improving the economic efficiency of the overall supply chain.  This paper seeks 
to focus on key factors affecting the success of traceability in improving compliance and on how 
to evaluate incentives necessary to ensure compliance with traceability objectives.  To do so, we 
use the illustrative case presented by injection site lesions in beef to complete a numerical 
simulation framework that has broad application to many similar issues of information 
asymmetry in food supply chains. 
The Case of Injection Site Lesions (ISLs) in Beef 
Management-related quality problems such as injection-site blemishes cause substantial losses 
for the beef industry in the United States.  Beef cattle are given injections of biological or 
antibiotic compounds at various stages of their lives to prevent disease and facilitate recovery 
from illness (Field and Taylor 2004).  When given intramuscularly these injections may cause 
tissue damage.  Although the incidence of injection-site lesion defects in top sirloins is at a 
record low of 2.5% (McKenna et al. 2002), purveyors and retailers still ranked this as one of the 
greatest quality challenges facing the U.S. beef industry.  In response, the National Cattlemen's 
Beef Association has recommended all injections, regardless of age, be moved to the neck and 
that subcutaneous injections be administered when allowable (Morgan, Tittor and Lloyd 2004).    
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 ISLs remain concealed within the muscles and subcutaneous fat which makes damage 
observable only during portioning of the primal cuts (Roeber et al. 2001).  The meat packer 
fabricates carcasses into many beef products, and like cuts from different carcasses are 
commingled to create consistent boxes of beef cuts and products.  Hence, the direct tracking of 
products back to an individual animal and feedlot of origin is very difficult (Robb and Rosa 
2004).  Therefore, there may be an economic incentive for a meat packer to use a traceability 
system to trace ISLs back to the animal and feedlot of origin so that price discounts and rewards 
can be implemented.  However, traceability systems are costly and as with grading systems it is 
likely that there will be measurement error in traceability systems.    
This article uses a principal agent game structure to identify optimal levels of traceability 
(probability of accurately identifying offenders) and to help quantify incentive mechanisms 
necessary to induce first best behavior on the part of risk averse agents.  The generalized 
principal-agent framework necessary to numerically solve the problem is developed and 
parameterized using technical information on ISLs in beef.  Two scenarios are compared to the 
present beef supply chain where information asymmetry exists and there is no traceability.  One 
scenario assumes there is no information asymmetry (the first-best situation), and the other 
assumes there is information asymmetry but the packer can implement a traceability system to 
overcome the asymmetry.   
Previous Research 
Research related to the effect of information asymmetry on food safety and quality has focused 
on two alternative strategies: (1) to select producers' types on the basis of their levels of 
investment in product quality (overcoming adverse selection) and (2) to induce producers’ levels 
of effort on product quality and safety by incentive mechanisms (overcoming moral hazard).  
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Hennessy (1996), Chalfant et al. (1999) and Bogetoft and Olesen (2003) address the 
adverse selection issue.  Hennessy and Chalfant et al. show that measurement errors in testing 
and grading cause price-grade incentives to be insufficient to a market equilibrium in which the 
first-best level of investment in quality by producers is attained.  And Bogetoft and Olson show 
that these results hold only when trade occurs after grading, but do not hold when trade occurs 
before grading as in the present case of ISLs.  
Dubois and Vukina (2004), Starbird (2005) and King, Backus and Gaag (2007) are 
representative of studies investigating incentive mechanisms.   In all cases, principal-agent 
models are employed to evaluate the impacts of alternative incentive schemes on inducing 
desired performance.  King, Backus and Gage further show that reputation can be an added 
incentive mechanism to induce performance under a contract.   
A common characteristic of all previous studies is that at the time a signal correlated with 
an agent's action is observed, the principal knows the agent's identity.  This is certainly the case 
when raw material is tested on delivery.  However, once the processing of the raw material 
begins, unobservable delivery characteristics may become observable.  By this time the identity 
of the raw material supplier is likely to have been separated from the processed product.  This is 
the situation of injection-site lesions in beef, which provides the case for modeling the potential 
value of traceability systems and extends previous research to include traits which are 
unobservable at the time of trade. 
Conceptual Framework for the Principal-Agent Game  
A stylized description of the characteristics of the injection lesion problem is developed in a 
principal-agent analytical framework.  A meat packer (principal) purchases live animals from a 
group of homogeneous feedlot owners (agents) indexed by i = 1,…, N to run a one-time project.  
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Prior to this purchase, agent i (the feedlot owner) gives injections by a method that affects the 
frequency and type of injection-site damages in beef retail cuts.  The action space for injection 
and for each agent i will comprise three actions as Ai = {to give all injections in the rear leg, to 
give all injections in the neck area, to give all injections with a needle-free technique} which are 
unverifiable at the time of sale.  Giving injections in the rear leg potentially results in lesions in 
the highest valued cuts of the animal, while giving injections in the neck area may still result in 
lesions but in lower valued cuts.   The needle free injection method is most costly to implement, 
but is assumed to produce no lesions (Morgan, Tittor and Lloyd 2004).  The feedlot owner could 
choose not to give any injection.  However, we assume that the expected losses from animal 
diseases will be much higher than the costs of adopting a needle-free technique, so that not 
giving injections is a strictly dominated strategy for agent i.  
 A stylized traceability system is assumed to be added from the slaughter floor to the 
fabrication floor (traceability system's depth) in a typical beef packing plant.   Basarab, Milligan 
and Thorlakson (1997) describe a traceability system that we will assume is employed.  The 
system employs radio frequency identification, database management of products and flows, and 
sequential processing methods to maintain the identity of product to its origin.   
The traceability system is fully characterized by its expected traceback success of 
preserving information on an animal ID, and its supplier identity attached to beef retail cuts 
defined as t∈T.  Experiments conducted and reported by Basarab, Milligan and Thorlakson 
(1997) are used to set the expected traceback rates of success for three traceability systems as 
38.9%, 43.7% and 95% respectively, so that T = {38.9%, 43.7% and 95%}. 
Failures are expected to occur due to hardware and software breakdown and 
incompatibility, plant logistics and electromagnetic interferences with the radio frequency 
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identification readers.  However, whenever the system works properly it is 100% effective in 
tracing the product to the specific feedlot owner. 
Given the above stylized premise of agents' injection actions affecting lesions and the 
beef packer purchasing the cattle employing a traceability system, the two-stage sequential game 
with complete and perfect information played by the principal and each agent i runs as shown in 
Figure 12.   
 
Figure 1.  The timing of the principal-agent game with traceability  
Mathematical Optimization of Principal Agent Game 
The Principal’s Cost Minimization Function 
Every feasible event and its probability of occurrence is characterized in the context of injection-
site lesions with a traceability system in place. The variable Pl,(j) represents the probability of a 
particular injection site lesion outcome for the final product sold.  For l=0, the traceability system 
fails to work, making the packer unable to identify the origin of a lesion even if it exists.  For 
l=1, the traceability system works properly, making the packer able to identify the origin of the 
lesion if it exists.  The cost of the system is assumed to be a function of the success rate, so that 
more reliable systems will cost more to implement and operate.  Subscript j identifies the 
  
 
  
 
 
Time 
 
Principal 
and agent 
agree on 
the terms 
of the 
contract 
Agent 
undertakes 
actions and 
delivers cattle 
knowing system 
reliability and 
contingent 
payment scheme 
set by principal 
Injection-site 
damage is 
observed 
during meat 
processing 
and 
packaging 
Contingent 
income transfers 
are made 
Principal sets 
system’s 
average 
traceback rate 
of success and 
contingent 
transfers 
  
8 
individual lesion or combination of lesions which can be found in each carcass’ side3.  There are 
sixteen possible combinations (eight for if the traceability system works (l=1), and eight for if the 
traceability system fails to work (l=0)).  Using the subscripts ‘c’ for chuck steak, ‘r’ for round 
steak and ‘s’ for sirloin steak the j subscript can take on any combination of these three types of 
lesions or none of them.  So, for example, P1,0 is the case where the traceability system works 
and no lesion is observed.  Meanwhile, P1,(c,r,s) is the case where the traceability system works 
properly and there is at least one lesion in the chuck, in the round and in the sirloin, and so on.  
Finally, the probability that the traceability system will fail to work, P0*, is calculated as the 
summation of all event’s probabilities in which the traceability system fails to work 
(P0*=
( , , )
0,( )0
c r s
jj
P=∑ ). 
All ISL event probabilities depend on the action undertaken by the agent i.  Therefore, we 
define the probabilities of an ISL event for each of the random variables affected by the injection 
method used by agent i as follows: Fc(ai) at least one injection-site lesion in a chuck steak is 
observed given agent i undertook action ai∈Ai; Fr(ai) at least one injection-site lesion in a 
bottom-round is observed given agent i undertook action ai∈A; Fs(ai) at least one injection-site 
lesion in a top sirloin butt is observed given agent i undertook action ai∈Ai.  Given these 
definitions, it is possible to calculate all the probabilities in the model.  For instance, to calculate 
the probability that the traceability system works properly when implemented and at least one 
lesion will be observed in the chuck, in the round and in the sirloin we use 
P1,(c,r,s)=tFc(ai)Fr(ai)Fs(ai).  All the remaining events’ probabilities in the model are calculated in 
this same fashion. 
The packer (principal) makes an income transfer ‘Il,(j)’ to a particular feedlot (agent) as 
payment for the cattle.  For l=0 the traceability system fails to work and the income transfer (I0*) 
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is made to the feedlot regardless of the type of lesions being observed or even if no lesion is 
observed at all. For l=1, the traceability system works and now the packer can make the adjusted 
income transfer (I1,(j)) to the specific agent contingent on the combination of the three types of 
lesions or none of them. 
The principal’s objective is to minimize the costs of procuring the cattle subject to the 
costs and incidence of ISLs.  This objective function (1) reflects the amount of contingent 
income transfers the principal will make to cattle suppliers, the cost of using a traceability system 
and the revenue lost due to injection-site lesions damage (opportunity cost).  The function (.)SBcE  
is the second-best expected cost per head to the principal.  
(1)    
0* 1,( , , ) 0* 0* 0, 0, 0, 0,( , ) 0,( , )
0,( , ) 0,( , , ) 1,0 1,0 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1,( , ) 1,( , )
( , ,..., ) 2[ ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
    ( ) (
SB
c c r s c c r r s s c r c r c s c s
s r s r s c r s c r c c c r r r
s s s c r c r
E t I I P I P p P p P p P p p P p p
P p p P p p p P I P I p P I p
P I p P I
= + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + 1,( , ) 1,( , )
1,( , ) 1,( , ) 1,( , , ) 1,( , , )
) ( )
    ( ) ( )] ( )
c r c s c s c s
s r s r s r c r s c r s c r s
p p P I p p
P I p p P I p p p g t
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + + + +
 
In equation 1, g(.) is the function that gives the cost ($/hd) of tracing an animal through a 
meat packing plant as a function of t∈T and is increasing in T such that a packer can invest in a 
less expensive system with lower reliability or a more expensive system with greater reliability.  
The opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion in a chuck steak is pc∈ℜ+ ($/carcass’ side), the 
opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion in a round steak is pr∈ℜ+ ($/carcass’ side), and the 
opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion a sirloin steak is ps∈ℜ+ ($/carcass’ side). 
Agents’ Expected Utility Function 
The agent’s objective function is specified using the formulation proposed by Grossman and 
Hart (1983, p. 10), and assuming that agent i’s utility function U: ℜ2→ ℜ is of the following 
form.   
(2) U(Il,(j), ai)=k(ai)u(Il,(j))-d(ai)   
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In equation 2, U(.) is a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function and u(.) is a Bernoulli 
utility function as defined by Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1996, p. 184). 
Using equation 2, agent i's expected utility per carcass’ side conditional on the incentive 
mechanism set by the principal as a 10-tuple (t, I0*, …, I1,(c,r,s)) is given by equation 3.  
(3) ( , , )0* 1,( , , ) 0* 0* 1,( ) 1,( )0( | , ,..., ) ( )( ( ) ( )) ( )
c r s
i c r s i j j ij
U a s I I k a u I P P u I d a== + −∑     ∀ai∈Ai 
 We conduct all numerical exercises using a multiplicative separable utility function that 
respects all the conditions to obtain a well behaved problem (Grossman and Hart 1983, p. 38).  
Therefore, we set k(ai)= akce , u(Il,(j))= ,( )l j
kIe− , and d(ai)=0.  Finally, the resulting von Neuman-
Morgenstern utility function is given by equation 4.   
(4)    ,( )( ),( )( , ) 0l j a
k I c
l j iU I a e with k
− −=− >  
where k is the coefficient of constant risk aversion and ca is the cost of undertaking an action 
ai∈Ai.  
 The constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) form of equation 4 allows setting the cost 
(ca) of an action ai exerted by the agent i as negative income.  This feature makes it easier to 
interpret the resulting incentive mechanisms (Haubrich, 1994).  In addition, this functional form 
eases the representation of an increase in risk aversion since it may be done just by increasing the 
value of k. 
Given this framework, the principal first chooses an incentive mechanism (t, I0*,…, 
I1,(c,r,s)) for each ia
 ∈Ai and then selects the action the principal would like agent i to undertake 
such that the overall minimum expected cost is obtained.  In addition, any mechanism or contract 
should be incentive compatible so that it will be in agent i's best interest to undertake the action 
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chosen by the principal.  Finally, any mechanism should be such that the agent i will accept the 
contract.    
We adapt the solution framework developed by Grossman and Hart (1983) so that the 
principal-agent game with traceability is modeled as a two-step numerical optimization 
procedure.  In the first step, the program 5 is solved for each combination between ia
 ∈Ai and 
t∈T.   
(5a) 
0* 1,( , , )
0* 1,( , , ),...
min ( ,..., | , )
c r s
SB
c c r s iI I
E I I a t  
Subject to: 
(5b)
__
0* 1,( , , )( | , ,..., )i c r sU a t I I U≥  
(5c) ( , , )' '0* 1,( , , ) 0* 0* 1,( ) 1,( )0( | , ,..., ) ( )( ( ) ( )) ( )
c r s
i c r s i j j ij
U a t I I k a P u I P u I d a=≥ + −∑    ∀ai∈Ai 
In program 5, 0* 1,( , , )( | , ,..., )i c r sU a t I I
 is defined as equation 3 but with ia  in place of ai; 
U is agent i’s opportunity utility calculated with the value of the best option available to trade a 
carcass’ side4; Pl,(j) denotes the probability of a particular injection site lesion outcome for the 
final product sold given action ia
  was undertaken by agent i; ',( )l jP denotes conceptually the same 
probabilities but calculated as if agent i had undertaken a feasible action different from ia
 . 
Equation 5b gives the individual rationality or participation constraint, whereas equation 
5c gives the two incentive compatibility constraints in our model.  To facilitate the numerical 
resolution of the program, all constraints have been set in terms of certainty equivalents.   
  The second step consists of choosing the payment incentive values that lead to the overall 
minimum expected costs per carcass’ side to the principal among those results obtained with the 
first step.  
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 Numerical solutions for the PA model with traceability are obtained using macros built 
with Visual Basic for Applications linking Microsoft Excel and Microsoft Excel Solver.  The 
nonlinear programs given as equations 5a-5c are numerically solved with the Microsoft Excel 
add-in Solver that uses the Generalized Reduced Gradient (GRG2) nonlinear optimization code.   
Parameter Specification 
In regard to the costs of alternative injection sites, injections yield two outcomes: a healthier 
animal and a potential injection-site lesion.  It is assumed that any location of the injection is 
equal in regards to health, which allows us to focus on the costs related to the placement of the 
injection and its impact on lesions.  Table 1 summarizes the costs of the alternative injection sites 
available to feedlot owners.  
Table 1.  Value of the Parameters of the PA Model 
Agent’s  
Action 
Costs of Action 
($ per carcass’ 
side) 
Expected 
Frequency of 
Injection Site 
Lesion in Top 
Sirloin Butt, 
Fs(ai) 
(%) 
Expected 
Frequency of 
Injection Site 
Lesion in 
Bottom-Round, 
Fr(ai)  
(%) 
Expected 
Frequency of 
Injection Site 
Lesion in Chuck 
Steak, Fc(ai)  
(%) 
Give all 
injections in the 
rear leg 
Base cost = 0 2.50 11.30 9.98 
Give all 
injections in the 
neck area 
$0.17 more than 
rear leg 1.43 6.44 17.50 
Give all needle-
free injections  
$0.204 more 
than rear leg 1.43 6.44 9.98 
Source: Costs of actions were estimated based on Hilton (2005) and Dee Griffin (2005); Frequencies are 
calculated based on Roeber et al. (2000), Dee Griffin (2002) and Morgan, Tittor and Lloyd (2004).  
 
Any intramuscular injection may or may not result in tissue irritation and scaring (Field 
and Taylor 2004).   It is also assumed that feedlot owners are able to affect only 43% of the 
ultimate expected frequency of injection-site lesions5.  The remaining 57% are assumed to come 
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from the cow-calf stage of production and is outside the control of the feedlot owner.  Using this 
assumption with the values reported by Dee Griffin (2002), Roeber et al. (2000) and Morgan, 
Tittor and Lloyd (2004) for the expected frequency of injection-site lesions in beef retail cuts, 
gives the expected frequency of injection-site lesion for each agent's action in Table 1.  
It is assumed that the best reservation alternative available for a feedlot owner is to sell 
the cattle in the spot market rather than to a packer who may have implemented traceability.  
Assuming an average carcass weighs 787 pounds and may be sold at $1.22 a pound in the spot 
market (Roeber et al. 2000, p. 94), the feedlot owner has a risk-free alternative of selling a 
carcass’ side in the fed cattle market at $480 and this is used as the reservation utility of the 
agent.  Agents are also averse to the risk of being identified if the traceability system is 
implemented and we set a coefficient of absolute risk aversion equal to 0.75 to account for this 
risk aversion6. 
 The opportunity cost of cuts with ISLs is the greatest single recurring cost within the 
simulation.  We use the same procedure employed by Roeber et al. (2000, p. 98-100) to estimate 
the expected loss with injection-site lesions per side of a fed steer and heifer harvested in 2000.  
The opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion occurring in top sirloin butt (ps) is $ 11.02 per 
side, the opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion occurring in bottom-round (pr) is $ 9.91 per 
side, and the opportunity cost of an injection-site lesion occurring in chuck steak (pc) is $2.50 per 
side.  
 As described earlier, the traceability system is fully characterized by its expected 
traceback rate of success t∈T.  Pape et al. (2003) estimate that for a small sized (800 head per 
day) packing plant, implementing a traceability system using radio frequency identification 
technology with a 38.9% expected traceback rate of success would cost approximately $0.11 per 
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head. Other levels of success are not provided, so we employ a cost function (equation 6) used in 
the PA literature (Prendergast 1999) to represent the relation between traceability cost per head 
and expected traceback rate of success, where γ∈ℜ++ is a constant.  
(6) g(t) = γt2/2     
We solve equation 6 for γ and then insert the values taken from Pape et al. (2003) to find 
the numerical value of γ.  Using this value of γ, we solve for g(t) taking the remaining element of 
the set T.  Doing so yields the values $0.139 and $0.656 as the costs of traceability systems 
respectively with 43.7% and 95% of expected traceback rate of success. 
Scenarios and Results 
Three basic scenarios are created using characteristics and values of the case of injection-site 
lesions as a basis for the numerical simulations.  The first scenario is a benchmark scenario 
where full information is assumed to exist.  The second scenario represents the current situation 
of the existence of injection-site lesions with no traceability.  The third scenario, which is the 
basis for the evaluation of traceability as a second-best solution in the absence of full 
information, is a scenario which assumes traceability levels of alternative effectiveness as 
described above.  To numerically solve these scenarios it is necessary to specify parameters on 
the cost of injection site alternatives, the reservation utility of the agent, the opportunity cost of 
the ISLs, the cost of the traceability systems and the expected probability or incidences of 
injection-site lesions in cattle. 
Full Information Scenario 
Under full information every action undertaken by agent i  is fully and freely verifiable by the 
principal. Therefore, there will be no economic incentive for the principal to use a traceability 
system as conceptualized in the present article.   
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The optimization problem shown in equation 7a and 7b , reflects the certain amount of 
money (IFB) the meat packer transfers to cattle suppliers based on the action ai being observed 
and the negative externality caused by the agent on the principal accounted by the revenue lost 
due to injection-site lesions damage (opportunity cost).  All variables are as previously defined 
and the first step consists in solving equations 7a and 7b for every ai∈Ai. 
(7a) 
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , , )
min ( | ) 2[ ( ) ( )
( ) ( )]
FB
FB
c FB i FB c c r r c r c r s s s c s cI
s r s r s r c s r c
E I a I P p P p P p p P p P p p
P p p P p p p
= + + + + + + + +
+ + + + +     
subject to: 
(7b)    k(ai)u(IFB)-d(ai)≥ U  
where the full-information scenario probabilities are calculated as P0= (1-Fc(ai))(1-Fr(ai))(1-
Fs(ai)), Pc=Fc(ai)(1-Fr(ai))(1-Fs(ai)), Pr=(1-Fc(ai))Fr(ai)(1-Fs(ai)), and so on. Note that under the 
full-information scenario there are only eight contingencies since the identity of an agent i is 
always known. In other words, t=1 without any cost under the full-information scenario. Table 2 
shows the probability of lesions occurring in the full information scenario.  The only reason for 
positive probabilities with the needle free injection is that cattle may have been needle injected at 
the cow-calf stage and cannot be affected by the feedlot’s actions. 
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Table 2.  Expected Cost to Principal, Income Transfers to Agents and Probability of Injection 
Site Lesions Based on Agent’s Injection Method Under Full Information 
Probability of Injection Site Lesion Occurrence (%) Agent’s 
Injection P0 Pc Pr P(c,r) Ps P(c,s) P(r,s) P(c,r,s) 
In Leg 77.856 8.627 9.919 1.099 1.996 0.221 0.254 0.028 
In Neck 76.086 16.140 5.238 1.111 1.100 0.233 0.076 0.016 
Ndl-free 83.026 9.200 5.716 0.633 1.200 0.133 0.083 0.009 
Agent’s Injection Expected Cost to the Principal, 
FB
cE   
($/head) 
Income Transfers, IFB  
($/carcass’ side) 
In Leg 
In Neck 
Needle-Free 
963. 29 
962. 81 
962. 50* 
480. 00 
480. 17 
480. 20 
For Pj, j=0 for no lesion, j=c for lesion in chuck, j=r for lesion in bottom round, j=s for lesion in 
sirloin.  Combinations indicate multiple lesions. 
 
Because (.)FBcE is strictly increasing in IFB, the principal offers an income transfer for 
each action ai that just guarantees that the agent's reservation utility will be obtained.  In other 
words, the participation constraint (7b) is always binding at the optimum.  This result, jointly 
with the assumption on the behavior of the utility function u(. ), implies that the optimal level of 
utility per carcass’ side to be granted to the agent i is given by solving equation 8.  
(8) ( ) ( ( )) / ( )FB i iu I U d a k a
∗ = +  
Having found the value of ( ),FBu I
∗ it is straightforward to calculate the income to transfer 
to the agent i whenever action ai is observed by using equation 9.  
(9) ( ( ))FB FBI v u I
∗ ∗=  
Where v(. ) denotes the inverse function of the Bernoulli utility function u(. ).  The second step 
consists of choosing the action that leads to the overall minimum expected cost for the principal.  
The complete cost of ISLs to the principal and the income transfers made by the principal 
to the agent under various injection actions are also shown in table 2.  This shows that the overall 
minimum expected cost to the principal ( FBcE
∗ = $962.50 per head) occurs when agent i gives all 
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injections with a needle-free technique.  Hence, under full information the meat packer would 
contract every agent to give all injections with a needle-free technique by offering a fixed 
income transfer of $480.20 per carcass’ side.  Since $480 is the value of a carcass’ side in the 
market, $0.20 per carcass’ side is the price-premium the principal pays the agent as a means of 
covering the additional costs the agent incurs in giving all injections with a needle-free 
technique.  The feedlot owner will comply with the contract because the meat packer can observe 
the feedlot owner’s action and punish the feedlot owner by giving zero payment whenever the 
contracted action is not performed.   
Second-Best Scenarios - Injection Site Lesions without Traceability 
The current situation in the beef industry is that there is information asymmetry and no 
traceability.  Therefore, information on the identity of the fed cattle supplier is detached from 
carcasses along their disassembly and fabrication, so it is impossible for the principal to create 
incentive mechanisms based on the observed injection-site lesion damage.  The only alternative 
left to the principal is to offer a constant payment per head to agent i.   
 Because the principal wants to minimize costs, the equilibrium for the game without 
traceability is for the principal to pay the market equilibrium price $960 per head (fed cattle 
market price), and for agent i to give all injections in the rear leg since this is a zero cost action 
for him/her to undertake.  The expected costs for the first-best and for the second-best without 
traceability must be equal and the packer incurs the costs of ISL products and the expected cost 
for a meat packer that does not use a traceability system is $963.29 per head as shown in table 2.   
Second-Best Scenarios – Injection Site Lesions with Traceability 
The final scenario is the second-best scenario of implementing traceability.  The solution 
procedure for this scenario was previously discussed in the context of program (5).  With 
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traceability the meatpacker incurs the costs of implementing traceability and these costs are a 
function of the level of reliability as described earlier.  Therefore, it’s necessary to solve the 
model for all combinations of traceability reliability and the injection action of the agents.   
Before proceeding with solving the program 5, it is necessary to ensure that the 
Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition (MLRC) is satisfied (Salanié 1997, p. 118). The MLRC is 
satisfied if: 
(10)  , ,
, ,
n m n m
q m q m
P P
P P
−
−
≥  for every action n, q∈Ai 
Where action n is more costly to agents than action q, and for all contingencies m preferred to -m 
from the principal's perspective.  The results to the MLRC test obtained by applying (10) showed 
that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Conditions do not hold for the ISLs’ case.  To overcome this 
problem, eight additional constraints given as equation 11 are imposed to the program 5 to 
guarantee that the more preferred the outcome is the higher the contingent income transfer (Il,(j)) 
will be7. 
(11)   I1,0≥ I0; I0≥ I1,c; I1,c≥ I1,r; I1,r≥ I1,(c,r); I1,(c,r)≥ I1,s; I1,s≥ I1,(c,s); I1,(c,s)≥ I1,(r,s); I1,(r,s)≥ I1,(c,r,s) 
Results obtained by solving the first-step of the second-best PA model with traceability 
are presented in table 3.  The expected costs presented in the third column of table 3 are the 
values for the objective function of the program (equation 1) evaluated at the income transfer 
mechanism that minimizes it for each combination between agent's action and the traceability 
system's expected traceback rate of success.  
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Table 3.  First-Step Results to the PA Game with Traceability 
Agent’s 
Action 
Traceability System’s Expected 
Traceback Rate of Success  
 (%) 
Expected Cost, SBcE  
($/head) 
(1) 38. 9 963.40 
(2) 38. 9 963.08 
(3) 38. 9 962.82* 
(1) 43. 7 963.43 
(2) 43. 7 963.11 
(3) 43. 7 962.84 
(1) 95. 0 963.95 
(2) 95. 0 963.62 
(3) 95. 0 963.35 
Note: (1) denotes the action of giving all injections in the rear leg, (2) refers to the action of giving all 
injections in the neck area, and (3) stands for the action of giving all injections with a needle-free 
technique.  * denotes the overall minimum expected cost to the principal. 
 
 The second-step in solving the PA game with traceability consists of choosing the 
incentive mechanism that leads to the overall minimum expected cost to the principal and 
imposing the additional constraints of equation 11.  From table 3, $962.82 per head is the overall 
minimum expected cost that the principal can obtain.  The incentive mechanism that will induce 
the agent i in his/her best interest to give all injections with a needle-free technique (action 3) is 
given as follows.   First, the principal announces to agents that the traceability system works with 
38.9% of expected traceback rate of success.  Second, the principal announces the income to be 
transferred to the agent in each alternative lesion outcome as dollars per carcass’ side as 
presented in table 4.   
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Table 4.  Incentive Mechanisms from the First-Step Solution to the PA Model with Traceability 
and Expected Frequencies of Occurrence of Each Contingency 
Income Transfers  
I0* I1,0 I1,c I1,r I1,(c,r) I1,s I1,(c,s) I1,(r,s) I1,(c,r,s) 
Agent’s 
Action 
Traceability 
System’s 
Expected 
Traceback 
Rate of 
Success  
(%) 
($/carcass’ side) 
(1) 38. 9 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 
(2) 38. 9 480.27 480.27 480.27 479.70 479.70 479.70 479.70 473.33 473.33 
(3) 38. 9 480.32 480.35 480.32 479.75 479.75 479.75 479.75 473.87 470.93 
(1) 43. 7 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 
(2) 43. 7 480.28 480.28 480.28 479.69 479.69 479.69 479.69 473.49 473.49 
(3) 43. 7 480.32 480.35 480.32 479.75 479.75 479.75 479.75 474.04 471.09 
(1) 95. 0 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 480.00 
(2) 95. 0 480.30 480.30 480.30 479.69 479.69 479.69 479.69 474.69 474.69 
(3) 95. 0 480.32 480.36 480.32 479.77 479.59 479.77 479.59 475.23 472.23 
Probability of each Contingency Occurring 
P0* P1,0 P1,c P1,r P1,(c,r)  P1,s P1,(c,s)  P1,(r,s)  P1,(c,r,s)   
(%) 
(1) 38. 9 61.10% 30.29% 3.36% 3.86% 0.43% 0.78% 0.09% 0.10% 0.011% 
(2) 38. 9 61.10% 29.60% 6.28% 2.04% 0.43% 0.43% 0.09% 0.03% 0.006% 
(3) 38. 9 61.10% 32.30% 3.58% 2.22% 0.25% 0.47% 0.05% 0.03% 0.004% 
(1) 43. 7 56.30% 34.02% 3.77% 4.33% 0.48% 0.87% 0.10% 0.11% 0.012% 
(2) 43. 7 56.30% 33.25% 7.05% 2.29% 0.49% 0.48% 0.10% 0.03% 0.007% 
(3) 43. 7 56.30% 36.28% 4.02% 2.50% 0.28% 0.52% 0.06% 0.04% 0.0004% 
(1) 95. 0 5.00% 73.96% 8.20% 9.42% 1.04% 1.90% 0.21% 0.24% 0.027% 
(2) 95. 0 5.00% 72.28% 15.33% 4.98% 1.06% 1.04% 0.22% 0.07% 0.015% 
(3) 95. 0 5.00% 78.87% 8.74% 5.43% 0.60% 1.14% 0.13% 0.08% 0.009% 
Note: (1) denotes the action of giving all injections in the rear leg, (2) refers to the action of giving all injections in 
the neck area, and (3) stands for the action of giving all injections with a needle-free technique.  
 
These results show that to induce agents to give all injections with a needle-free 
technique, $480.32 will be paid to the agent if the traceability system fails to work.  If the 
traceability system works then $480.35 will be transferred when no damage is observed (I1,0), 
$480.32 will be transferred if at least one injection-site lesion is observed in chuck steak (I1,c) 
and so on for the rest of results as presented in table 4.  Except for the case in which an ISL is 
observed in the chuck, all other contingencies when the traceability works imply some sort of 
punishment on the agent since the income transfer is less than $480 (market value of a carcass’ 
side).  Agents will only be rewarded in contingencies in which the traceability system fails to 
properly work or the traceability system works and no damage is observed or only damage in 
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chuck is observed. But even the low level of reliability (38.9%) is sufficient to induce agents to 
use needle free injection methods. 
The probability of the income transfers are shown in table 4.  For the low level of 
traceback and the needle free injection method, the transfer I0* = $480.32 will occur 61.1% of 
time, I1,0 = $480.35 will occur 32.30% of the time and so on for the rest of the results.  Using 
these values to calculate the expected transfer to agents yields $480.31 per carcass’ side.  Hence, 
the principal will pay an average price-premium of $0.31 per carcass’ side to get agents to accept 
this incentive mechanism.  This price-premium will serve to cover the higher costs the agent will 
incur to give all injections with a needle-free technique ($0.204) and to pay a risk-premium 
($0.106).  The income transfers will vary little across contingencies.  This means that the 
principal should avoid imposing risk on agents to minimize risk premiums paid to agents.  
Comparing Scenarios 
The first-best solution for the injection-site lesion case study is compared with the second-best 
solution by using equation 12.   
(12) min{ , }WT SB FBc c cE E E
∗ ∗ ∗−  
Where WTcE
∗ is the expected cost per head obtained for the second-best solution without 
traceability, and SBcE
∗ is the overall minimum expected cost per head obtained for the second-best 
with traceability; FBcE
∗ is the overall minimum expected cost per head obtained for the first-best 
problem.  
The result of equation 12 gives the cost of living in a world with asymmetric information 
and also gives the "Agency Costs" that would be defined as the cost due to the separation of 
ownership and management.  In the present context, the meat packer delegates the management 
of the feedlot to feedlot owners.  The Agency Cost is in theory mitigated by the use of incentive 
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mechanisms and eliminated either by the meat packer buying the feedlot or vice versa (vertical 
integration).  
Finally, the value of traceability is given by equation 13.  
(13) WT SBc cE E
∗ ∗−  
 Inserting the costs of scenarios reported into equation 13, the cost of living in a second-
best world (agency cost) is: min{963.29, 962.82} – 962.50 = $0.32 per head.  The $0.32 per head 
is incurred because a traceability system has to be in place and a price-premium has to be paid to 
agents to get them to participate in the contract in a world with asymmetric information.  The 
value of traceability calculated using equation 13 is $963.29 - $962.82 = $0.47 per head, or an 
800 head per day plant as assumed here would save approximately 800 head x $0.47 per head = 
$376 per day.  Therefore, the reduction in the losses with injection-site lesions by inducing an 
agent to give all injections with a needle-free technique offsets the costs incurred with the use of 
a traceability system, and with the payment of price premiums to compensate agents for 
accepting a risky payment scheme and undertaking a more costly action. 
Sensitivity Analysis  
The case of injection site lesions is indicative of a broad class of problems in the food chain 
where an upstream agent’s actions affect downstream product attributes which may not be source 
verifiable when the adverse outcome is discovered.  Choosing this case allowed us to 
parameterize and solve the underlying principal agent problem, but to further generalize the core 
implications, we conducted a sensitivity analysis of the key variables affecting the value of 
traceability.  These insights are applicable to any problem characterized as above. 
The primary factors affecting the economic value of traceability include the level of risk 
aversion of the agents, the agent’s ability to affect the outcome of a product attribute, the cost of 
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the system to the processor and the cost of the agent’s actions.  To consider how these factors 
interacted, we simulated the model with nine values for the absolute risk aversion parameter 
k∈{0.125, 0.250, …,1.125}, nine different frequencies by which lesions are produced 
(EFOF)∈{0.33, 0.40, 0.43, 0.50, 0.60,…,0.90, 0.95} and nine different values for the costs of the 
traceability systems as percentage mark-ups of the base cost estimates x∈{1, 1.5, …, 5}.  For 
instance, by multiplying the original traceability costs by 1.5 we are simulating a 50% increase in 
their costs. Finally, we simulate the models using nine different values for the costs of agents’ 
actions (CAA) by multiplying the original values of each injection action by a factor that belongs 
to the set y∈{1.1, 1.2,…,1.7}.  
For each simulation we calculated the value of traceability according to equation 13 so 
that we generated a series of 27 values for the value of traceability. Using the values obtained 
with the simulations we estimated the following model. 
Value of Traceability =-0.3761- 0.0221*x - 0.5363*y - 0.0327*ln(k) + 3.2494*EFOF,   
 R2 = 0.9961 
 The estimated model shows that a 10% increase in the original traceability costs would 
cause a reduction of $0.00221 in the value of using a traceability system. We also found that if 
the original value of the costs of traceability systems increased more than five times, no 
traceability system would have economic value. Note that for the case of an increase of 10% in 
agents’ cost of actions the value of traceability would decrease by $0.05363. From the estimated 
model we also note that the value of a traceability system decreases (-0.0327k-1) with the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion (k) of agents at increasing rates (0.0327k-2). In the limit, a 
very high k might cause a traceability system to become economically infeasible. Finally, we 
observe that for each percent increase in the effect of feedlot owners’ action on the final 
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frequency of lesion (EFOF) the value of traceability goes up by $0.032494. This result shows 
that the less the upstream party (feedlot) can do to mitigate a problem, because it is created in 
early stages in the supply chain; the lower will be the value of a traceability system like the one 
we have modeled in this article. 
For all simulations the traceability system with 38.9% of expected traceback rate of 
success is the one to be optimally chosen by the principal.   This illustrates that the results are 
robust in regard to the underlying factors affecting investment decisions in traceability, and that 
even a relatively imperfect system can be sufficient to enforce first-best behavior in agents. 
Conclusions 
One of the key implications of traceability is that it has the potential to reduce information 
asymmetry in the supply chain and result in better allocation of economic value to participants.  
To illustrate this point, the case of ISLs in cattle was used to numerically simulate the economic 
incentives and economic values which can be attained through a prototypical reduction in 
information asymmetry.   This study has adapted the general two-step procedure developed by 
Grossman and Hart (1983) to model and solve a principal-agent model wherein a meat 
traceability system is in place to affect the decision of injection-site choice in cattle.  This 
extends the Grossman and Hart (1983) work to make it applicable to a real world case-study.  
 Simulation results based on technical data on injection site incidence showed that a meat 
traceability system has economic value as a device allowing for an incentive mechanism to exist.  
Yet, the incentive mechanisms made feasible with the use of a traceability system are not 
expected to offer much different income transfers across contingencies.  This is due to the fact 
that the agents are risk averse and the principal must avoid placing too much risk on the agents or 
they will choose not to participate.   However, it was also shown that by allowing the principal to 
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create and use incentive mechanisms, a meat traceability system could induce agents in his/her 
best interest to undertake the first-best action.  
 The optimal traceability rate of success was also examined.   This is important because as 
greater reliability of traceability is desired costs increase.   We found that 38. 9% is the optimal 
expected traceback rate of success to be chosen by the principal among those considered as 
feasible in the present study.  This is the lowest expected traceback rate of success among those 
evaluated in this article.  This finding supports the idea that it is possible for a relatively 
unreliable traceability system to allow for incentive mechanisms strong enough to induce feedlot 
owners in their best interest to undertake the first-best action.   Hence, at least for purposes of 
enticing agents to undertake first best actions, it may be possible to have relatively low cost 
tracing systems in place.   
 Although injection site lesions are a relatively minor issue in food safety, it is indicative 
of a class of problems characterized by an attribute negatively affecting the value of a product 
which can only be discovered after the sales transaction is made and the supplier can no longer 
be identified.  Other previous work has focused on cases where testing or grading could be 
completed at the time of the transaction so that the supplier could be penalized or rewarded 
immediately.     
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 Breadth is the amount of information recorded by the system, depth denotes how far backward 
and forward traceability is maintained, and precision represents the system's ability to pinpoint 
the original source of a problem (Golan et al.  2004).  
2 A game with complete and perfect information implies that players' payoff functions are 
common knowledge and that at each move the player with the move knows the full history of the 
game (Gibbons 1992, p. 55).  By the time an agent moves he/she knows the traceability system’s 
reliability and the contingent payment scheme previously set by the principal.  
3 Each carcass’ side is assumed to be independent of the other for the same animal.  Thus, the 
final expected cost per head is twice as much as the cost per carcass’ side.  Without this 
assumption, the number of events would have increased from sixteen to 256 with very low 
probability of occurrence for most of them.  Furthermore, data on the incidence of injection-site 
lesions is reported in terms of carcass’ sides with no reference to the correlation between sides. 
4 For instance, U should be thought of as the level of utility the agent i might get by trading with 
a meat packer that does not use a traceability system, paying the market price.  
5 Dexter et al. (1994) found that the majority (80 to 90%) of the blemishes found in top sirloin 
butts were originated at the cow-calf or stocker levels, or early in the finishing period. We could 
not find similar studies for the other beef cuts (e.g. chuck and round). Thus we consider 
(10%+20%)/2 and (100%-(10%+20%)/2)/3 as being the effect of feedlot owner in terms of 
producing ISLs respectively in the final and early stages of the finishing  period. Sum the two 
values gives 43%. 
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6 Hardaker et al. (2004, p. 109) classifies farmers who are somewhat risk averse or normal as 
having a relative risk aversion equals to 1. Dividing 1 by 0.75 and applying the same scale of 
measure employed by Haubrich (1994, p. 264) we find $1.33 million as being the net worth a 
feedlot owner should have so that the coefficients absolute and relative risk aversion are equal. 
Note that 1.33 million would represent 1.85 times the value of 750 head sold at an average price 
of $960 per head. According to RTI International (2007), cattle-feeding operations with 500 or 
more head maintain 42% of cattle inventories, and half of those cattle are held on operations with 
1,000 or more head. 
7 These constraints respect the fact that whenever no ISLs are found and the traceability system 
does not fail, the economic loss will be the lowest. The second lowest expected loss occurs when 
the traceability system fails because in this event it may happen that no ISLs have been found 
that produces a lower average loss compared with the other contingencies. The other constraints 
follows the same idea, an ISL in the chuck causes a lower economic loss than if it is in the 
bottom-round and an ISL in the bottom-round causes lower economic loss than an ISL in the top 
sirloin. 
